Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have spread in both poultry and wild 26
Experimental infection of highly and low pathogenic avian influenza viruses to chickens,
Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have spread in both poultry and wild 26 birds. Determining transmission routes of these viruses during an outbreak is essential for the 27 control of avian influenza. It has been widely postulated that migratory ducks play crucial 28 roles in the widespread dissemination of HPAIVs in poultry by carrying viruses along with their 29 migrations; however close contacts between wild migratory ducks and poultry are less likely in 30 modern industrial poultry farming settings. Therefore, we conducted experimental infections 31 of HPAIVs and low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) to chickens, domestic ducks, 32 tree sparrows, jungle crows, and black rats to evaluate their roles in virus transmission. The 33 results showed that chickens, ducks, sparrows, and crows were highly susceptible to HPAIV 34 infection. Significant titers of virus were recovered from the sparrows and crows infected with 35 HPAIVs, which suggests that they potentially play roles of transmission of HPAIVs to poultry. 36 In contrast, the growth of LPAIVs was limited in each of the animals tested compared with that 37 of HPAIVs. The present results indicate that these common synanthropes play some roles in 38 influenza virus transmission from wild birds to poultry. 39
Introduction 43
Influenza A viruses are widely distributed in mammals and birds. Influenza A viruses of 44 each of the known subtypes (H1-16 and N1-9) have been isolated from water birds, particularly 45 from migratory ducks (Kida et al., 1979; Fouchier et al., 2005) . Therefore, migratory ducks 46 are the natural hosts for influenza A viruses (Webster et al., 1992; Kida, 2008 http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/web-portal-on-avian-influenza/).
HPAIVs are 50 generated when non-pathogenic viruses circulating among water birds are transmitted to 51 chickens via domestic water and terrestrial birds, where they acquire pathogenicity in chickens 52 via multiple infection and replication in the chicken population (Ito et al., 2001) . After 2005, 53 H5N1 HPAIVs were isolated from dead migratory water birds on the way back to their nesting 54 lakes in Siberia in May (Liu et al., 2005; Okamatsu et al., 2010; Sakoda et al., 2010) . The 55 pathogenicity of HPAIVs to migratory ducks varies depending on the virus strain 56 (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2003; Sakoda et al., 2010; Kajihara et al., 2013) H5N1 strain Hok/Vac1 were intranasally inoculated into 4 chickens (Fig. 1a) . All of the 173 chickens inoculated with VN/559, Hok/4, HK/810, or Tw/0502 died within 4 days post 174 inoculation (dpi). Three out of four chickens inoculated with Km/1-7 died within 4 dpi; 175 however one chicken survived for 14 days without exhibiting any clinical signs. It was notable 176 that this surviving chicken did not seroconvert after 14 dpi ( 
Pathogenicity of HPAIVs and LPAIVs to domestic ducks 187
To examine the pathogenicity of these HPAIVs and LPAIVs to water fowls, the viruses 188 were intranasally inoculated into 4 domestic ducks ( seroconverted after 14 dpi, whereas none of the ducks inoculated with Tw/0502 seroconverted 198 (Table 2 ). Other 4 ducks inoculated with each of the viruses were euthanized at 3 dpi, and 199 virus titers in tissue samples were determined (Table 4) 
Pathogenicity of HPAIVs and LPAIVs to tree sparrows 208
All of the sparrows inoculated with VN/559, Hok/4, HK/810, or Km/1-7 died within 10 209 dpi (Fig. 1c) . Notably, the sparrows died suddenly without exhibiting detectable clinical signs 210 until 1 or 0.5 days before death. Immediately before death, these sparrows exhibited 211 depression and astasia. Only one sparrow inoculated with Tw/0502 died at 12 dpi; whereas the 212 remaining sparrows survived throughout observation period without any clinical signs. All of 213 the sparrows inoculated with Ah/1 or Hok/Vac1 survived for 14 days and some of them 214 seroconverted at 14 dpi, thereby suggesting that the sparrows were infected with these virus 215 strains (Table 2) . Viruses were recovered from the blood or brain samples of all the sparrows 216 infected with VN/559, Hok/4, or HK/810 at 3 dpi (Table 5 ). However, viruses were recovered 217 from the blood or brain samples of 2 out of 4 sparrows inoculated with Km/1-7 although viruses 218 were recovered from each of the four sparrows inoculated. Growth of the Tw/0502 was 219 limited in the respiratory and intestinal tracts, which are the primary replication sites of 220 influenza viruses, suggesting that these cases were not systemic infections. No virus was 
Pathogenicity of HPAIVs and LPAIVs to jungle crows 224
All of the jungle crows inoculated with HK/810 died within 7 days (Fig. 1d) Hok/Vac1 at 14 dpi, which suggests that this virus did not infect the crows. Viruses were 234 recovered from the brains of crows infected with HK/810 or Km/1-7 (Table 6 ). In contrast, 235 only low titers of viruses were recovered from the lungs of the crows infected with VN/559. clinical signs (Fig. 1e) . Black rats inoculated with these viruses seroconverted at 14 dpi, 244 except those with Km/1-7 and Hok/Vac1 (Table 2) . Only low titers of virus were recovered 245 from the kidney and colon of one of four black rats inoculated with Hok/4 ( 
Discussion 250
In the present study, we analyzed the susceptibility of chickens and ducks, as well as 251 common synanthropes, namely tree sparrows, jungle crows, and black rats, to infection with 252 influenza viruses to assess the potential roles of these animals in influenza virus transmission 253 from wild migratory ducks to domestic poultry. VN/559, Hok/4, HK/810, and Tw/0502 caused 254 lethal infections to all chickens inoculated with 10 6.0 EID 50 of each virus (Fig. 1a) . In contrast, 255 1 out of 4 chickens survived for 14 days after the inoculation with Km/1-7. The lack of any 256 detectable antibody response in this chicken suggests that the infectivity of Km/1-7 to chickens 257 is relatively low compared with other HPAIVs (Table 2 ). This finding is well consistent with a 258 previous report by Kanehira et al. (2015) . A previous study demonstrated that 50% lethal dose 259 of Km/1-7 to chickens was 10 5.8 EID 50 , which is comparable to challenge dose in the present 260 study (Gamoh et al., 2015) . Thus the chicken survived without detectable antibody response.
going to die in case where virus infection occurs. In contrast, ducks were highly susceptible to 263 infection with Km/1-7 (Table 4) , which suggests that this virus strain is readapted to water fowls, 264 and thus it has decreased infectivity to chickens. Notably, none of the ducks infected with 265
Km/1-7 exhibited clinical signs. These findings suggest that ducks infected with this virus 266 strain can transfer viruses during their migration, resulting in the widespread dissemination of 267 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses (Hall et al., 2015) . None of the ducks seroconverted after infection with 268
Tw/0502, which suggests that ducks were not infected with this virus strain ( Table 2) . Km/1-7 (Fig. 1c, than chickens (p < 0.05; Fig. 1a, c) . Considering that high titer of viruses were recovered from 287 the dead birds, it is possible that sparrows infected with HPAIVs may shed viruses without 288 showing clinical signs during their slightly longer incubation period. This suggests that 289 sparrows infected with HPAIVs may play a role as a vector in virus transmission from wild 290 migratory ducks to chickens. Interestingly, virus growth of Tw/0502 in sparrows was limited 291 in the respiratory and intestinal tracts, which is common in avian influenza virus infections 292 (Table 5 ). This was also the case even in the dead sparrow at 12 dpi when infected with 293 Tw/0502, where viruses were recovered from oral and cloacal swabs as well as the colon (data 294 not shown). The virus and host factors involved in systemic infection in these small birds are 295 not known. On the other hand, evidence of systemic infections in small birds such as tree 296 sparrows is a risk factor for virus invasion into poultry houses via these birds. Thus, further 297 studies should determine the factors related to virus pathogenicity to these birds. 298 The pathogenicity of HPAIVs to jungle crows depended on the virus strains (Fig. 1d) . In 299 general, virus growth in crows was less drastic than that in sparrows ( Fig. 1a, d ). Accordingly, preventing direct contact between these birds and 309 poultry is important for reducing the risk of HPAIV invasions in poultry houses. 310 Compared with sparrows and crows, black rats were less susceptible to HPAIV infections 311 (Fig. 1e, Table 7 ). In Japan, three species of rodents are recognized as synanthropes: house 312 mice (Mus musculus), brown rats (Rattus norvegicus), and black rats (Rattus rattus). Among 313 them, black rats are found most commonly in poultry houses. Although a previous study 314 demonstrated that HI antibodies against H5 influenza virus was detected rom wild rats collected 315 in swage system in Egypt (El-Sayed et al., 2013) , there is no report, to our knowledge, on the 316 isolation of HPAIVs from black rats. In addition, experimental infection of HPAIVs in 317 laboratory rats, which originated from brown rats, demonstrated that virus growth is limited 318 (Shortridge et al., 1998) . These facts suggest that Rattus species, which is the most common 319 small animal observed in poultry houses, are resistant to HPAIV infections. 320
Growth of Ah/1, which is designated as an LPAIV, was highly limited in each animalcompared with that of the HPAIVs (Tables 3-7) . Previously, a natural infection with a Chinese 322 H7N9 viruses in a tree sparrow was reported; however, the dissemination of these viruses in 323 wild birds is limited (Zhao et al., 2014) . This may be related to the fact that the distribution of 324 this virus strain is limited to the southeast part of mainland China (Lam et al., 2015) . 325 Nevertheless, multiple replication and the transmission of H5 and H7 LPAIVs in chicken 326 populations may result in generation of HPAIVs. Thus, the continued monitoring of H5 and 327
H7 LPAIVs in wild and domestic animals is recommended for the control of avian influenza. 328
Hok/Vac1, which is an H5N1 vaccine strain licensed in Japan is a reassortant virus between 329 non-pathogenic H5N2 and H7N1 viruses isolated from fecal samples of migratory ducks (Soda 330 et al., 2008) . Although Hok/Vac1 is expected to have similar character to viruses circulating 331 among migratory ducks, no virus was recovered from ducks inoculated with Hok/Vac1 (Table 4) . 332 On the other hand, ducks inoculated with this virus seroconverted at 14 dpi (Table 2 ). This 333 indicates that Hok/Vac1 infected the ducks and might slightly replicate; however, virus growth 334 of Hok/Vac1 was not brisk in these ducks, progeny viruses were not recovered from the tissue 335
samples. 336
In the present study, animals were inoculated with 10 6.0 EID 50 of each virus. Serological 337 analyses indicates that 50% infectious doses of each HPAIV for each animal are 10 6.0 EID 50 or 338 less except those of Tw/0502 for ducks and Km/1-7 for black rats. Chickens infected with 339 VN/559 shed up to 10 9.1 PFU/ml of viruses from swabs and ducks infected with Hok/4 shed up 340 to 10 5.9 PFU/ml of viruses at 3 dpi (data not shown). Considering that these titers are 341 from chickens and ducks to sparrows, crows, and black rats in natural settings. On the other 343 hand, although animals were seroconverted after the infection with 10 6.0 EID 50 of Ah/1 or 344 Hok/Vac1, none of animals inoculated with Hok/Vac1 shed virus (Table 3-7) and virus shedding 345 from animals infected with Ah/1 was at most 10 1.7 PFU/ml in an oral swab sample of a crow 346 (data not shown). Accordingly it cannot be assumed that these LPAIVs are successfully 347 transmitted from a flock to another via sparrows, crows, and black rats. 348 The present results illustrate the importance of wild synanthropes for virus invasion into 349 poultry houses in HPAIV transmission from wild migratory ducks to chickens. The infectivity 350 of HPAIVs to chickens varies depending on the strains; generally 10 3 -10 4 EID 50 is estimated as 351 the 50% lethal dose in chickens (Shichinohe et al., 2013) . In sparrows and crows, higher titers 352 of virus were recovered when compared with the lethal dose in chickens. On the other hand, 353 virus growth was less drastic in black rats. Accordingly, avian synanthropes have a higher risk 354 of introducing viruses into poultry houses. Although these birds play a role in the transmission 355 of HPAIVs, the biosecurity system which protects poultry houses from virus invasion along 356 with human activities is fundamental for the prevention of HPAI outbreaks. Also, the early 357 detection of outbreaks and a stamping out policy will reduce the possibility that viruses spill out 358 into wild animals, which leads secondary outbreaks.
Thus, these golden standard 359 countermeasures for the prevention of HPAI outbreaks must be essential for the successful 360 eradication of HPAIVs.
20

Conflict of interest statement 363
None. 364
365
Acknowledgments 366
We gratefully acknowledge technical support from R. Sawayama and M. Sasada. We 367 thank Mr. M. Hagihara of Nansei Youkei Co., Ltd., Japan for his valuable suggestions for the 368 present study. We thank Dr. Takehiko Saito of the National Institute of Animal Health, Japan 369 for kindly providing A/chicken/Kumamoto/1-7/2014 (H5N8). We thank Dr. Luk S.M. El-Sayed, A., Prince, A., Fawzy, A., Nadra-Elwgoud, Abdou, M.I., Omar, L., Fayed, A., Gamoh, K., Nakamizo, M., Okamatsu, M., Sakoda, Y., Kida, H., Suzuki, S., 2015. influenza virus isolated from a chicken in Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan in 2014.
402
J Vet Med Sci.
403
Gao, R., Cao, B., Hu, Y., Feng, Z., Wang, D., Hu, W., Chen, J., Jie, Z., Qiu, H., Xu, K., 404 Xu, X., Lu, H., Zhu, W., Gao, Z., Xiang, N., Shen, Y., He, Z., Gu, Y., Zhang, Z.,
405
Yang, Y., Zhao, X., Zhou, L., Li, X., Zou, S., Zhang, Y., Yang, L., Guo, J., Hiono, T., Ohkawara, A., Ogasawara, K., Okamatsu, M., Tamura, T., Chu, D.H., Suzuki,
413
M., Kuribayashi, S., Shichinohe, S., Takada, A., Ogawa, H., Yoshida, R.,
414
Miyamoto, H., Nao, N., Furuyama, W., Maruyama, J., Eguchi, N., Ulziibat, G., Ito, T., Goto, H., Yamamoto, E., Tanaka, H., Takeuchi, M., Kuwayama, M., Kawaoka, 1 (2.1) 1 (1.0) 0 3 (3.9) 3 (2.5) 4 (4.5) 4 (4.1) 4 (4.5) Hok/4 4 (5.7) 1 (3.3) 1 (2.5) 2 (5.0) 4 (5.3) 3 (6.3) 4 (5.3) 4 (6.4) HK/810 1 (5.6) 1 (3.7) 1 (6.1) 1 (7.4) 1 (7.4) 1 (7.5) 1 (9.8) 1 (7.4) Km/1-7 4 (3.0) 2 (2.5) 3 (3. 
